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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
The

state appeals

from the

district court’s

statements.

The

district court held, calling

rights apply

even

if the

Statement

Of The

The

state

Facts

defendant

is

it

order suppressing evidence 0f Kent’s

a matter of ﬁrst impression, that

not in custody.

And Course Of The Proceedings

charged Kent With possession 0f methamphetamine, possession 0f

marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 32-34.) Kent
statements t0 police ofﬁcers, asserting they were

The

district court

room”

defendant’s

as part of a probation search.

later.

(R., p. 68.)

claimed the paraphernalia was not
his

Miranda

made

rights,

moved

to suppress his

involuntarily. (R., pp. 54-56.)

found that ofﬁcers “found paraphernalia and contraband in the

ofﬁcers arranged a meeting

him

Miranda

Kent

(R., p. 68.)

Kent agreed t0 speak t0 ofﬁcers, and initially

(R., pp. 68-69.)

his.

stated that

Kent was not home, so

When

the ofﬁcer

he would not answer questions.

began reading

(R., p. 69.)

The

ofﬁcer continued reading the rights, after which Kent agreed t0 speak to the ofﬁcer and

made

several statements. (R., p. 69.)

The
t0

district court ﬁrst

Miranda.

his

Miranda

(R., pp. 69-72.)

found that Kent was not in custody and therefore not subj ect

The

rights the ofﬁcer

answer questions.

district court

had

(R., pp. 72-77.)

then held, however, because Kent was read

to cease questioning

The

state

once Kent stated he would not

ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal from the

court’s order suppressing Kent’s statements. (R., pp. 80-81.)

district

ISSUE
Did
situations?

the district court err

by concluding

that

Miranda

rights apply t0 non-custodial

ARGUMENT
The

District

Court Erred

BV Concluding That Miranda Rights Apply To Non-Custodial
Situations

A.

Introduction

In

held: “the prosecution

Miranda the Supreme Court

may

not use statements,

Whether exculpatory 0r inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 0f the
defendant unless

it

demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective t0 secure the

Miranda

privilege against self—incrimination.”

(emphasis added). Here, the

district court

custodial interrogation. (R., p. 70.)

statements under Miranda.

made

Supreme Court 0f

the United

However, the

was

The

district court nevertheless

district court’s

in a non-custodial setting

States,

unsupported by the cases cited by the
situations

found that Kent’s statements did not stem from

(R., pp. 72-77.)

rights to statements

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)

V.

error because

Miranda

contrary t0

district court.

is

excluded the

expansion 0f Miranda

was contrary

t0 precedent

0f the

applicable Idaho precedent,

Expanding Miranda

and

to noncustodial

a judicial rule speciﬁcally designed to address the

inherent coerciveness 0f custodial interrogation and limited t0 that type of potential

coercion.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“‘In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a

evidence, the standard 0f review

is

to suppress

bifurcated.” State V. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 912-14,

436 P.3d 1252, 1261-62 (2019) (quoting

State V. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576,

1169, 1171 (2010)). The appellate court will accept the

they are clearly erroneous.

motion

Li. (quoting

trial

225 P.3d

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact unless

James, 148 Idaho

at

576, 225 P.3d at 1171.)

However, the appellate court

freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional

principles in light of the facts found.

Li. (quoting

James, 148 Idaho

at

576, 225 P.3d at

1171)

The District Court Erred When

C.

T0 Non-Custodial
The

decision

is

inconsistent With precedent of the

The Supreme Court

custodial circumstances

Extended The Miranda Presumption Of Coercion

Situations

district court’s

the United States.

It

is

in

Miranda “presumed

Supreme Court 0f

that interrogation in certain

made

inherently coercive” and therefore statements

course 0f custodial interrogation are “inadmissible unless the suspect

is

in the

speciﬁcally

informed of his Miranda rights and freely decides t0 forgo those rights.”

New York

M165,

The Miranda

rights,

467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

however, are merely “prophylactic” and “not themselves rights protected by the

Constitution.”

Miranda
its

V.

“is

Li. (internal quotations omitted).

justiﬁed only

beneﬁts outweigh

its

by reference

costs.”

The
statements

district

is

its

judicially crafted rule” such as

t0 its prophylactic

Maryland

quotations and citation omitted). Because
“obligation t0 justify

“A

V. Shatzer,

Miranda

is

purpose and applies only where

559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010)

a court—created rule,

it is

(internal

the court’s

expansion.” Li. at 105 (internal quotations omitted).

court’s

expansion 0f Miranda to exclude Kent’s non—custodial

not justiﬁed. “Because Miranda warnings

may

inhibit persons

from giving

information, this Court has determined that they need be administered only after the person

is

taken into ‘custody’ 0r his freedom has otherwise been signiﬁcantly restrained.”

V. Elstad,

470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). “If

errors are

Egg

made by law enforcement ofﬁcers

in

administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same

irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth

Here, even if the ofﬁcer erred

Miranda

rights, granting

to the reasoning

and

Moreover, the

itself.”

by prematurely 0r unnecessarily informing Kent of

Kent the presumption

intent

Amendment

that his statement

was coerced

is

Li
his

contrary

ofMiranda.
not stopping questioning might be used

district court’s rationale that

t0 coerce a statement is contrary t0

inherently coercive. Because

Miranda‘s justiﬁcation that a custodial environment

Miranda safeguards

is

“protect the individual against the

coercive nature of custodial interrogation, they are required only Where there has been such

a restriction 0n a person’s freedom as to render

564 U.S. 261, 270 (201

him

in custody.” J.D.B. V.

1) (internal quotations omitted).

North Carolina,

“[A] noncustodial situation

is

not

converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes
that,

even in the absence 0f any formal

arrest or restraint

questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.

495 (1977).

”’

Oregon

V.

Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,

Indeed, the “requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a

person’s exercise” of the right t0 “cut off questioning”
the coercive pressures

(1

on freedom of movement, the

0f the custodial

setting.”

is

because that right “counteracts

Michigan

V.

Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104

975) (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted). Because the reason the invocation 0f

the right to silence

must cut off questioning

in the

Miranda context

is

t0 counteract the

pressures 0f the custodial setting, the district court’s reasoning that cutting off questioning

might prevent some

future, hypothetical coercion falls short ofjustifying the

expansion of

the right to non—custodial settings.

The

district court’s

decision

is

also inconsistent with Idaho precedent.

Hurst, 15 1 Idaho 430, 258 P.3d 950 (Ct. App. 201

1),

the Idaho Court

In

m

oprpeals addressed

the issue of whether a suspect could invoke

Miranda

rights, speciﬁcally the right to

counsel, outside of the context of custodial interrogation. After noting that the issue had

“not [been] previously addressed
state

in

It

and federal jurisdictions

...

by the

appellate courts 0f this state,”

have held

that a person must, at a

order t0 eﬁ’ectively invoke Miranda rights.”

I_d.

at

it

stated that “[o]ther

minimum, be

in custody

434, 258 P.3d at 954 (emphasis added).

then quoted the following analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court as “persuasive”:
“It is

not surprising that Virtually every Supreme Court opinion involving

Miranda has used
interrogation With

the phrase

‘custodial interrogation.’

Which Miranda was concerned. It is the
Miranda and

attorney during custodial interrogation that
protects.

(2000)).

258 P.3d

“We

custodial

right t0
its

an

progeny

That right does not exist outside the context of custodial

interrogation.

Li. at 436,

is

It

One cannot invoke

at

956 (emphasis

a right that does not yet exist.”

original, quoting

likewise hold that a person

may

People

V. Villalobos,

not invoke a Fifth

193 111.2d 229

Amendment

right to

counsel, With the prophylactic effect 0f cutting off questioning Without an attorney present,

if the

person

The
court in

is

not in custody.” Li.

district court’s

m

reasoning

is

contrary to the holding and analysis of

m. The

reasoned and held that Miranda rights arise from custodial interrogation and,

absent such custodial interrogation they d0 not exist.
this case is factually different in that

The

district court

pointed out that

Kent was informed ofthe right to silence before

stating

he did not Wish t0 answer questions, Whereas Hurst stated his desire for a lawyer

unprompted.

1

The

(R., p. 74.

1)

However,

this difference is not a distinction.

The

basis for the

Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 503-04 (Ct. App. 2000),
noting that the court there addressed Whether Whipple’s ambiguous statements were an
district court also cited State V.

was noncustodial. (R., pp. 73-74.) The
state submits that the Court 0f Appeals did not signal how it would come out 0n this issue
by not addressing the topic at all. At best, this case stands for the proposition that neither
side raised the legal signiﬁcance of the fact Whipple was not in custody as an issue.
invocation

ofMiranda even though

the interview

6

holding in

Idaho

at

m

is

that

one cannot invoke a right that “does not yet

436, 258 P.3d at 956 (internal quotation omitted). Here, as in

cut off additional questioning

granted

exist.”

by Miranda did not

by invoking

court’s holding that they arise

151

the right t0

the right against compelled self—incrimination

Miranda

yet exist.

m,

m,

from the ofﬁcer

from custody.

rights arise

stating

them

The

district

in a non-custodial setting is

ﬂawed.
Finally, the district court’s analysis has

been speciﬁcally rejected by other

courts.

In State V. Haddock, 897 P.2d 152, 162-63 (Kan. 1995), abrogated 0n other grounds

V.

James, 79 P.3d 169 (Kan. 2003), the court held that “the safeguards against

incrimination established

by Miranda

“giving Miranda warnings,

itself,

custodial interrogation.” In

Hannon

...

do not

m
self-

exist outside ‘custodial interrogation’”

and

does not transform a noncustodial interrogation into a
V. State,

84 P.3d 320, 337-38 (Wyo. 2004), the court

held that an ofﬁcer did not have to cease questioning the suspect after the suspect expressed
a desire to talk t0 an attorney because “the rights recognized in Miranda, including the
right t0 counsel, apply only in the context

The reasoning employed by

Commonwealth

V.

0f custodial interrogation.”

the

Morgan, 610 A.2d 1013

district

court

was speciﬁcally

(Pa. Super. 1992).

rejected

in

In that case the trial court

held that continued questioning after rights were invoked was improper because ofﬁcers

took “the precautionary step of reading Miranda rights to a non-custodz‘al suspect.”

1016 (emphasis

original).

I_d.

at

This expansion 0f Miranda was unjustiﬁed, however, because

the policy encapsulated in the

Miranda

custodial interrogation. Li. at 10 1 6- 1 8.

rule addressed only the presumptive coercion of

Finally, the reasoning

(Mass. 2015),
statements

is

made

0f the court in Commonwealth

Libby, 32 N.E.3d 890

V.

persuasive. In reversing the lower court’s order suppressing evidence 0f

in a non-custodial interview because

ﬁrst pointed out that “‘[T]he premise of Miranda

0f a request for counsel, the court
that the danger

[is]

from the interaction 0f custody and ofﬁcial interrogation.”

0f coercion results

Li. at

895-96 (brackets

original, quoting Illinois V. Perkins,

496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)). Thus, the non-custodial

interview “was simply not governed

by Miranda.”

Li. at 900.

Because the interview was

non-custodial, the suspect could “not effectively invoke a ‘right’ t0 counsel.”

Miranda

rights prior t0 custody is “a step taken in

I_d.

Reading

an abundance of caution” and

is

“encouraged.” Li. (internal quotations omitted). However, the suspect’s statements about
counsel during the non-custodial interview and

made

warnings “did not require the ofﬁcer t0 cease

questioning, and did not render his

statements inadmissible under Miranda.”

made

all

Li The

after

being given his Miranda

statements were inadmissible only if

involuntarily. Li. at 901-02.

The reasoning of these

courts

is

Miranda

persuasive.

not a constitutional

is

standard, only a court-created rule designed t0 ameliorate the possibility of coercion

inherent in custodial interrogation.

and does not extend

Miranda

rule

beyond

0f his

its

underpinnings the

where the ofﬁcer,

Miranda

in

The

is

limited t0

its

of coercion.

underlying reasons,

By

expanding the

district court erred.

protections should be expanded to non-custodial

an abundance of caution but unnecessarily, informs a suspect

rights, the district court relied

1998).

such, the rule

t0 other, different possible risks

In concluding that

settings

As

district court erred

on United States

V. Bautista,

because Bautista does not support

145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir.

its

holding 0r reasoning.

First, the court in

Bautista correctly stated the applicable legal standard: “Absent either a

custodial situation or ofﬁcial interrogation,

Later

rights

it

“was not

stated that if the suspect

“were ineffective.”

custody,

Miranda

is

Li

at 1149.

Li.

waived these

not implicated.” Li. at 1147.

[is]

Miranda

in custody” then his attempts t0 invoke

The court was

correct in this statement: absent

not implicated and attempts to invoke

The court then went 0n
voluntary.

Miranda

t0 address

it

are ineffective.

Whether the waiver 0f the right

was

t0 silence

(“we are concerned only with whether Bautista voluntarily and knowingly

rights” in the non-custodial interview (emphasis added».

does not agree that

this

was

Although the

the correct analysis (the correct analysis

is

state

whether the

statements were coerced, Libby, 32 N.E.3d at 901-02; see also Salinas V. Texas, 570 U.S.
178, 183-85 (2013) (right t0 silence
the right unless the speech

is

must be afﬁrmatively claimed and speaking waives

coerced», the court did not hold that the Miranda presumption

0f coercion extended t0 non-custodial

settings.

Second, the opinion’s analysis of statements
dicta,

and

in fact double dicta.

made

in the non-custodial interview is

The court acknowledged

introduced into evidence in any form

at the trial.

Li. at 1148.

The court analyzed

statements only as to their effect on the admissibility of subsequent statements

subsequent custodial interview.
that

its

“result

I_d.

were not

that the statements

made

the

in a

Then, t0 complete the double-dz'cta, the court stated

would be the same” regardless of how

it

analyzed the non-custodial

statements. Li. at 1149.

Even

to the extent the Bautista court’s reasoning could

support the district court’s conclusion. Kent initially told Ofﬁcer
t0 talk” t0 him,

be applied,

it

Bonzo he was

and they talked as Kent waited for his carpool. (4/5/19

does not
“willing

T11, p. 9, L. 11

— p.

Ofﬁcer Bonzo told Kent about “the basic ﬁndings ofprobation’s

10, L. 4; p. 11, Ls. 9-21.)

investigation 0f controlled substances and drug paraphernalia found in [Kent’s]

his property.”

(4/5/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 7-1

Miranda warning” Kent
11, L.

22 —

stated that

p. 12, L. 9.)

Kent was Willing

21

— p.

“While [Ofﬁcer Bonzo] was giving him the

1.)

he “would not answer any questions.” (4/5/19

Tr., p.

Ofﬁcer Bonzo completed giving the warnings and again asked

t0 talk to him.

responded, “Yeah, you can follow
p. 12, L.

home on

13, L. 1.)

(4/5/19 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-20; p. 18, Ls. 1-6.)

me” and

led Ofﬁcer

The conversation

Bonzo

into his house.

lasted 10-15 minutes

carpool arrived. (4/5/19 Tr., p. 13, L. 8-14; p. 18, L. 21

— p.

if

Kent

(4/5/19 Tr.,

and ended when Kent’s

19, L. 2.)

These

facts

d0 not

support a conclusion that ﬁnishing the Miranda warnings and asking if Kent would talk to
the ofﬁcer rendered Kent’s statements involuntary.

make any ﬁnding that the

Moreover, the

district court

did not

statements were involuntary, as opposed t0 ﬁnding that there

was

a Miranda Violation. (R., pp. 68-77.)

The

district court

found a Miranda Violation, a ﬁnding unsupported by applicable

law. Because the district court erroneously expanded the

settings, its suppression order

Miranda

rights to non—custodial

must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectﬁllly requests this

Court t0 reverse the

district court’s

suppressing Kent’s noncustodial statements.

DATED this 27th day of November, 2019.
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